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How Far Does Charles
Taylor Take Us in
Developing a Christian
Understanding of the
Secular Age?

by James W. Skillen
Charles Taylor’s A Secular Age1 is a remarkable
book that has received much praise and many reviews since its publication eight years ago. Many
Dr. James W. Skillen directed the Center for Public Justice
from 1981 until his retirement as president in 2009. Prior
to 1981, he taught political science and philosophy at
three Christian colleges, including Dordt College. He edited the Center’s periodicals and has written or edited 15
books, including In Pursuit of Justice: Christian-Democratic
Explorations (2004), With or Against the World? America’s
Role Among the Nations (2005), and most recently The
Good of Politics: A Biblical, Historical, and Contemporary
Introduction (2014).

Christian scholars have been among its sympathetic and even enthusiastic readers. James K.A.
Smith thinks A Secular Age is so important that
he wrote a book just to guide readers through it.2
The greatest strength of Taylor’s book, in my estimation, is its descriptions and categorizations of
a wide range of developments in the West during
roughly the last five centuries. I have some questions, however, about the author’s approach to
the subject and about what we are left with in the
end. In what follows I engage Taylor critically on
two fronts: first, the way he develops his primary
concern with the “conditions for belief” as those
conditions relate to transcendence, and second,
what he misses in his account of American civil
religion.
Conditions of Belief
Taylor makes clear at the outset that his focus will
be on the “conditions of belief ” in a secular age,
not on the separation of church and state or the
purported decline of religious belief and practice
(2). His aim, he writes, is to try “to define and
trace” the change that has taken us “from a society
in which it was virtually impossible not to believe
in God, to one in which faith, even for the staunchest believer, is one human possibility among others” (3). It is clear from this statement of intent as
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well as from all that follows in the book that he
does not focus on the content and truth claims of
particular faiths, including Christianity.
Taylor contends that our age is no longer religious in a pre-modern sense and that religious belief is now a matter of choice. He explores a variety
of such choices in order to assess the conditions for
them. At the outset he says he will speak of religion
and religious belief as referring to transcendence
and will speak of the secular, in the modern sense,
as referring to immanent reality. A secular age,
therefore, “is one in which the eclipse of all goals
beyond human flourishing [within immanent reality] becomes conceivable…. This is the crucial link
between secularity and a self-sufficing humanism,”
which he also calls “exclusive humanism” (19-20).
In this age, those who reject a transcendent deity
live by unbelief, he says, in contrast to those who
live by belief in God.
Taylor writes, “I want to talk about belief
and unbelief, not as rival theories…. Rather what
I want to do is focus attention on the different
kinds of lived experience involved in understanding your life in one way or the other, on what it’s
like to live as a believer or an unbeliever. As a first
rough indication of the direction I’m groping in,
we could say that these are alternative ways of living our moral/spiritual life, in the broadest sense”
(4-5). Taylor believes that in some broad sense everyone’s life takes “a certain moral/spiritual shape.”
The unstated implication here is that there is more
to life than its moral/spiritual shape, the other dimensions presumably being what most Westerners
refer to as their daily work and experiences (their
“secular” life?) and which Taylor elsewhere refers
to as “ordinary human flourishing” (510).
Enlarging his description of the moral/spiritual
shape of life, Taylor says, “Somewhere, in some activity, or condition, lies a fullness, a richness; that
is, in that place (activity, or condition), life is fuller,
richer, deeper, more worth while, more admirable,
more what it should be” (5). Those experiences in
certain places, activities, or conditions “help us
to situate a place of fullness, to which we orient
ourselves morally or spiritually. They can orient us
because they offer some sense of what they are of:
the presence of God, or the voice of nature, or the
force which flows through everything, or the align2
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ment in us of desire and the drive to form” (6).
In a way, Taylor says, “this whole book is an
attempt to study the fate in the modern West of
religious faith in a strong sense. This strong sense
I define, to repeat, by a double criterion: the belief in transcendent reality, on one hand, and the
connected aspiration to a transformation which
goes beyond ordinary human flourishing on the
other” (510). Near the end of his book he says, “I
have told a long story because I believe that one
can only get a handle on this if one comes at it
historically…[for] one’s story only makes sense in
the light of a certain understanding of the place of
the spiritual in our lives” (768). As we look to the
future of our different stories, he says, there is one
view, “which flows out of mainline secularization
theory” that “sees religion shrinking further and
further”:
I see another future, based on another supposition.
This is the opposite of the mainstream view. In our
religious lives we are responding to a transcendent reality. We all have some sense of this, which
emerges in our identifying and recognizing some
mode of what I have called fullness, and seeking
to attain it. Modes of fullness recognized by exclusive humanisms, and others that remain within
the immanent frame, are therefore responding to
transcendent reality, but misrecognizing it (768).

By the end of his book, in other words, Taylor
offers a more subtle and qualified understanding
of the difference between belief and unbelief. The
moral/spiritual shape of the believer’s life is a consciously intended response to transcendence and
is thus religious. But the moral/spiritual shape of
the unbeliever’s life, though not emerging from a
religious response to transcendence, does in fact
respond to it but “misrecognizes” it in the quest to
experience some kind of fullness. Belief and unbelief are both responses to transcendence, but belief
recognizes it, and unbelief misrecognizes it.
If we pay close attention to Taylor’s word usage, we can hear the shifts in meaning, the equivocations that try to bridge between old and new
cultural contexts and between diverse modes of
reasoning and believing. For example, on the one
hand, he believes that all humans do respond to
“a transcendent reality,” which is what religious

belief is all about, at least in the traditional sense
of those terms. On the other hand, those who do
not believe in anything transcendent (“exclusive
humanists” and those who “remain within the immanent frame”) are acting spiritually (religiously?)
insofar as they are seeking to attain a “fullness” or
“richness” of life. An experience or sense of fullness
may be brought on by an entirely immanent experience, perhaps hearing the voice of nature, but
from Taylor’s point of view it has a religiously parallel or equivalent character even if the person having the experience misrecognizes the meaning of

Taylor contends that our
age is no longer religious
in a pre-modern sense and
that religious belief is now a
matter of choice.
it. What is the relation, then, we may ask, between
the structure of reality, which apparently includes
immanence as well as transcendence, and the different human responses to that reality? Who is
qualified, and on what basis, to judge between the
recognition and misrecognition of transcendence?
At the start, Taylor says he wanted to get at
the difference between a life of belief and a life of
unbelief, but in passages like the ones just quoted
he compares an experience of the presence of God
with an experience of hearing the voice of nature
or feeling “the alignment in us of desire and the
drive to form.” Should we take it that all of these
experiences are equivalent in some way and that
all are equally legitimate? Does the difference between belief and unbelief not matter? Or does the
misrecognition of transcendence by unbelievers—
or at least some unbelievers—present a problem
that ought to be overcome?
Recognition and Misrecognition of
Transcendence
Taylor says he wants to “focus attention on the
different kinds of lived experience” rather than
on theories about experience (4-5). Yet he doesn’t
really focus on lived experience in the full-orbed

sense of that term but only on “alternative ways
of living our moral/spiritual life.” However, is it
not precisely the relation of the spiritual to the
ordinary (the religious to the secular) that is the
central question in debate today about the character of life in the modern world? Can he get away
with setting aside the non-spiritual dimensions of
lived experience and still present an adequate account of the secular age? Taylor takes for granted
the duality of spiritual/ordinary, religious/secular,
without offering a justification for his stance. Then
he works to avoid the problem presented by denials of transcendence by simply affirming that those
denials are the consequence of a misrecognition of
transcendence.
By speaking of “misrecognizing” transcendence, however, Taylor has shifted to another level
of characterization and categorization. The duality
of “recognize/misrecognize” is quite different from
the dualities of religious/secular and belief/unbelief. First of all, it conveys a normative judgment
about what constitutes a person’s recognition or
misrecognition of transcendence. In ordinary language that contrast conveys a judgment that the
former is correct and the latter is a mistake. But
that’s not a consideration Taylor chooses to confront. Yet the normative judgment that a person
has recognized or misrecognized the transcendent
would seem to call into question the axioms and
assumptions that undergird secularist thinking of
the exclusive humanist variety, because that framework is built on the belief that there is no transcendence. From the standpoint of those who believe
there is nothing transcendent, couldn’t it be said
that Taylor misrecognizes the truth about reality
by projecting an indefensible belief in transcendence? Taylor’s normative judgment about recognition and misrecognition, consequently, calls
for a self-critical account of his own most basic
suppositions and assumptions about the nature of
reality. He believes there is, in fact, no completely
self-enclosed, self-sufficient immanent reality, as
exclusive humanists believe, and therefore to hold
such a belief would appear to be more than a mere
visual, mental, or moral mistake but rather an errant belief, something fundamentally problematic.
Taylor’s belief (that such a belief is errant)
leads directly to another very important question,
Pro Rege—March 2015
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namely, what is entailed in the recognition of transcendence? Is it sufficient, in Taylor’s mind, for
a person to profess that there is something transcendent? Or is the identity of true transcendence
important? He states at several points that he is
a Christian. How much of his Christian understanding of reality, then, should he divulge in order to account for the grounds of his judgment
about the recognition and misrecognition of transcendence? Based on traditional Christian teaching and presuppositions, might we not expect him
to believe that a good and healthy life, including
a healthy moral/spiritual life, depends on orienting oneself to the love of the true God and the
concomitant love of neighbors, as the Bible urges
again and again? It would not be surprising, one
would assume, for Taylor himself to believe that
there are some quests for fullness or richness that
are seriously misdirected, perhaps destructive, or
even evil.
As far as I can see, these are not questions Taylor
wants to engage. One consequence is that some
of his most basic suppositions and beliefs about
the nature of reality remain undisclosed. What he
does divulge is that he has chosen Christian faith
for himself as others have chosen to follow other
paths of belief or unbelief. Does this choice imply
that each person’s choice of faith is so personal, so
confined to the shaping of his or her moral/spiritual experience, that each choice and experience has
little to do with making judgments about the normative ordering of society? If that is true, then to
what extent does A Secular Age help in providing a
critical Christian assessment of our secular age, of
the full range of lived experience in our day?
Discerning Idolatry?
Taylor makes an even sharper judgment (than
the one about recognition/misrecognition) when
he criticizes those who think “they have got God
right” or who think they are pure and right. Such
judgments are clearly idolatrous, he says, and
“idolatry breeds violence” (769). Here he sounds
very much like those modernists who are convinced that strong religious claims spell danger
and lead to violence. Yet Taylor also sounds very
postmodern in his objection to anyone who makes
a claim to certainty about universal truth. How
4
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then can he be sure he is right in criticizing those
who claim to have gotten God right? What moral
norms ground that judgment and what is the root
of those norms? To speak of idolatry in the strong
sense sounds pre-modern, not modern or postmodern. But Taylor is clearly not using the word
“idol” to mean what it means in the Bible or in traditional Christianity. “Idolatry” is a charge he levels at those who exhibit an immodest attitude when
they draw an “unambiguous boundary between
the pure [themselves] and the impure” (769). He
is not joining a debate about the true God and
false gods. Rather, he is asserting an unqualified
judgment about the boundary between modest
from immodest attitudes and social behaviors: it is
pretentious and self-righteous (from Taylor’s point
of view) for anyone to make the claim that they
can draw an “unambiguous boundary” or get God
right. He is sure he is right about that.
Moshe Halbertal and Avishai Margalit shine
some light, indirectly, on Taylor’s position here
in their book Idolatry.3 The authors point to three
kinds of modern discourse on idolatry that replace, extend, or invert the biblical meaning of
idolatry. With regard to “replacement” and “extension” modes of discourse they say, “The complementary concept to idolatry is no longer a proper
God but something else. Thus the category of idolatry is maintained, while what is in opposition to
it changes. A second, more radical modern use of
the language of idolatry occurs when the category
of idolatry is extended to include any competing
opposite, even what was supposedly conceived as
the right God himself ” (241).
Taylor gives no account of how he came to his
exclusivist judgment about idolatrous belief, and
throughout the book he mostly avoids expressing
such definite, unqualified opinions. More typical
of his manner and style is to object to some position by merely suggesting an alternative, as when
he makes the case for his minority view of the
secularization process. He is not convinced by the
argument of secularization theorists that the decline of religious belief will continue until religions
whither away. He suggests another possible future
of the secular age, one in which choices of shaping
moral/spiritual life will continue to exhibit religious liveliness as long as people continue to aspire

to “a transformation which goes beyond ordinary
human flourishing”:
Thus, my own view of “secularization”, which I
freely confess has been shaped by my own perspective as a believer (but that I would nevertheless
hope to be able to defend with arguments), is that
there has certainly been a “decline” of religion. Religious belief now exists in a field of choices which
include various forms of demurral and rejection;
Christian faith exists in a field where there is also
a wide range of other spiritual options. But the interesting story is not simply one of decline, but
also of a new placement of the sacred or spiritual
in relation to individual and social life. This new
placement is now the occasion for recompositions
of spiritual life in new forms, and for new ways of
existing both in and out of relation to God (437).

Even if Christian faith has lost the public status
and influence it had when it was the all-encompassing cultural glue of medieval Christendom,
Taylor believes that Christian faith is still a possibility today for those who choose it. Yet the secular
age appears, in this affirmation, just to be there,
serving as a religiously neutral, society-wide platform on which many different faiths, demurrals,
and rejections can be chosen and celebrated in personal ways with or without God.
But what is the origin, character, and motivational dynamic of the secular age as an age, as
an identifiable era? Taylor, it appears to me, underestimates the institutional and social shaping
power of modern secularist beliefs that have done
so much to shape and organize all areas of public
and not only personal life. The secular age did not
appear out of thin air as a new social environment
in which people are free to operate. The shaping
of life in the West from the time of the crisis of
medieval Christendom has been one of conflict,
often with violent struggles over the most basic
beliefs about how to organize and govern society
and about the very meaning of human society.
Among the visions and drives competing to shape
the “new world,” the most influential across wide
swaths of public as well as private life has been
modern secularism—exclusive humanism, or selfsufficing humanism—expressed through a wide
range of philosophies and ideologies to be sure,

but also through organized political, economic,
and popular cultural movements. The wide range
of socially gripping ideologies has included materialism and freedom-idealism, individualism, and
collectivism. To be sure, the secularizing efforts
of all of these have not yet succeeded altogether.
Large numbers of people even in the West continue to believe in one or another transcendent reality
in the personal-choice way that Taylor describes.
But many believing Christians and people of other
faiths do not treat their religious commitments as
merely a choice they make. They are not willing to
accommodate to the public secularizing onslaught
without a fight. So political, economic, and educational struggles continue within many societies on
many fronts across much of the world.
It seems to me, therefore, that it is a mistake
to categorize exclusive humanism as either a nonreligious point of view or one among many possible personal beliefs in the open field of our secu-

Taylor, it appears to
me, underestimates the
institutional and social
shaping power of modern
secularist beliefs that have
done so much to shape and
organize all areas of public
and not only personal life.
lar age. While most of today’s Western societies
are more pluralistic with regard to both personal
belief and freedom, for synagogues, mosques, and
churches to operate, the dominant belief that has
been shaping the life of nations, economies, education, and more is neither private nor neutral. Its
aim, we might say, has been to establish one or
another kind of “seculardom” to fill the vacuum
of disintegrated Christendom. Taylor continues
to speak of religion in the narrow sense of that
term—as the shaping of moral/spiritual experience
that individuals and private communities choose
for themselves. He gives far too little attention to
how various belief systems, including self-sufficing
Pro Rege—March 2015
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humanism, contend with one another as spiritualmoral-cultural driving forces competing to shape
entire societies.
American Civil Religion
In the light of my criticism of Taylor’s lack of attention to the full range of lived experience, another valuable point of entry to his discussion of
the secular age is his description of American civil
religion that is found in the fourth major section
of his book, in which he considers “the age of
mobilization.” This is the age, he writes, in which
“whatever political, social, ecclesial structures we
aspire to have to be mobilized into existence”
(445). Beginning in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, he argues, Westerners no longer
accepted assigned stations under a naively assumed
sacred canopy as they did in ancient regimes. They
found themselves “persuaded, pushed, dragooned,
or bullied into new forms of society, church, association” (445). They not only adopted new
structures but also changed their view of the world
and the moral order. The age of mobilization still
finds room for God, but unlike the “ancien regime
model,” the newer order is no longer hierarchical.
Human authority is no longer bound up directly
with God’s authorization through some sacred
unction or representative figure or institution. If
the old order might be called “enchanted” (Max
Weber’s term), then the new order moves toward
“disenchantment,” often expressed religiously in
deism. Taylor explains:
Now with advancing disenchantment, especially
in Protestant societies, another model took shape,
with relation both to the cosmos and the polity.
In this the notion of Design was crucial. To take
the cosmos, there was a shift from the enchanted
world to a cosmos conceived in conformity with
post-Newtonian science, in which there is absolutely no question of higher meanings being expressed in the universe around us. But there is still,
with someone like Newton himself, for instance,
a strong sense that the universe declares the glory
of God. This is evident in its Design, its beauty,
its regularity, but also in its having evidently been
shaped to conduce to the welfare of His creatures,
particularly of ourselves, the superior creatures
who cap it all off. Now the presence of God no

6
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longer lies in the sacred, because this category
fades in a disenchanted world. But He can be
thought to be no less powerfully present through
His Design (446-47).

This new idea of divine presence through design
in the cosmos also significantly influenced the idea
of divine presence via design in the political order,
argues Taylor. Divine design is found in the moral
law, a natural law, that holds for human responsibility, as expressed, for example, in the American
Declaration of Independence: “Men have been
created equal, and have been endowed by their
creator with certain inalienable rights” (447).
Taylor goes on to say, “The idea of moral order
which is expressed in this Declaration, and which
has since become dominant in our world, is what
I have been calling the Modern Moral Order….
Its members are not agents who are essentially
embedded in a society which in turn reflects and
connects with the cosmos, but rather disembedded
individuals who come to associate together. The
design underlying the association is that each, in
pursuing his or her own purposes in life, acts to
benefit others mutually” (447).
This argument overlaps with Eric Nelson’s in
The Hebrew Republic.4 Nelson traces in detail the
work of some influential European thinkers in the
sixteenth and seventeenth centuries who sought to
find in ancient Israel’s “constitution” a model for a
modern republic. They were looking for a normative design that could endure over time and serve
any rational people as the model for their political
order. In locating the right design, they obtained
all they needed, politically speaking, from the
Bible. The work of those thinkers had great influence in the founding era of the American republic. The people no longer needed a transcendent,
personal authority to be active in human affairs.
Sacred history could be separated from secular history. The biblical story in its particularity was no
longer needed as the context for the mobilizing
efforts Taylor describes. Those who were not yet
ready to dispense with God altogether could appeal to an original designer of the cosmos (deism)
with its natural and moral laws, including laws for
the human moral order.
Taylor’s assessment of America’s civil religion,

it seems to me, depends too much on this design
argument and too little on what lies more deeply
beneath it, namely, the new-Israel myth, which
I believe was the more potent force molding the
self-understanding of the people as a nation.
The national new-Israel myth, with its roots in
Puritanism, often functioned in tension with, or
in contrast to, early American ideas of government
(448). The secular-religious contrast Taylor draws
is between the political system (connected indirectly to God through design) and “free churches,”
in which members experienced and expressed their

Taylor’s assessment of
America’s civil religion,
it seems to me, depends
too much on this design
argument and too little
on what lies more deeply
beneath it, namely, the newIsrael myth....
personal relation to the God whose salvation opens
the way to eternal life. The latter is what Taylor
calls religious, and the former is the secular. That
distinction reflects the now-standard sacred-secular view of America’s identity as a secular republic,
which supports the private religious freedom of
churches and individuals. The churches function
to “sustain the Godly ethos which the [secular]
Republic requires” (453).
However, this description hides from view
the civil-religious dynamics of the nation, which
precedes the design of the Constitution and its
First-Amendment protection of religious freedom
for individuals and churches. The motivating vision that drew Americans together into revolution
against England was the vision of themselves as a
new, divinely chosen nation. In my reading of A
Secular Age, the closest Taylor comes to acknowledging this vision is in his discussion of religious
denominationalism in the United States:

Just because one’s own church does not include
all the faithful, there is a sense of belonging to a
wider, less structured whole which does. And this
can find at least partial expression in the state. That
is, the members of mutually recognizing denominations can form a people “under God”, with the
sense of acting according to the demands of God
informing and maintaining their state, as in the
case of the American “civil religion” alluded to
above. Indeed, insofar as the divine Design includes freedom, this can be interpreted as calling
for an openness to a plurality of denominations.
This sense of a providential political mission has
been very strong among American Protestants,
and remains alive till this day (454).

Notice that in getting close to recognizing the
trans-denominational nation under God with its
“providential political mission,” Taylor lays emphasis on the design argument and the constitutional protection of religious freedom for a diversity of denominations. He then associates the meaning of the nation “acting according to the demands
of God” with “the state.” From the beginning,
however, Americans were leery of the state and
particularly of a strong central government. They
wanted to hold their state governments accountable to the people and to hold the federal government accountable to the states and the people. The
American civil religion was (is) not mediated by or
through the state but through the free people as a
nation whose originating covenant with God gives
it its identity and mission in the world.
The American civil religion, I am contending,
has functioned as the nationally unifying public
faith of a people who also, by their political constitution, assure themselves of freedom to practice
their denominational faiths privately. At one level
of consciousness this view represents a sacred-secular distinction between, on one side, the sacred
life of the churches, oriented toward the transcendent, and, on the other side, the self-governing republic busy with its “secular” affairs. But it is the
religiously grounded nation that undergirds the
whole, making room for private modes of worship as well as the work of a constituted government that is to serve the people and the nation.
Sacredness, therefore, is not confined to the life of
churches and religious denominational freedom.
Pro Rege—March 2015
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Religious sacredness characterizes the nation in its
core identity through the myth of its public origin,
mission, and destiny in covenant with America’s
god. This is a new, nationalistic religion that borrows a few elements from the Bible and Christian
tradition but is not a traditional religion in any
Christian or Jewish sense.
Christians, it seems to me, should be able to
recognize that America’s god is not the biblical
God, and that the American civil-religious way
of life is not fully compatible with a biblically directed way of life. From a Christian point of view,
America’s idea of itself as a new Israel comes from a
secularized, nationalized misappropriation of parts
of the biblical story. Christians and Jews should
recognize the blasphemy of a modern nation identifying itself as the new Israel, while at the same
time they can appreciate many of the country’s
constitutional features, such as the rule of law, limited government, and more.
Taylor again comes close to recognizing the religious character of the nation’s self-understanding
when he says that, on the one hand, “a denominational identity tends to separate religion from
the state. A denomination cannot be a national
church, and its members can’t accept and join
whatever claims to be the national church,” but,
on the other hand, “the political entity can be
identified with the broader, over-arching ‘church’,
and this can be a crucial element in its patriotism”
(454). However, what Taylor refers to as the overarching “church” is not a national church at all,
as he recognizes. The national bond, which Taylor
senses is religious in a significant sense, is the common public allegiance to America’s god, who has
chosen their nation to be a light to all nations.
What makes this look like an “over-arching” national church is precisely the religious character of
the myth of the nation as a publicly covenanted
community under its god. The nation was, in that
sense, constructed as a religio-political community.
This means that if we are to talk about religion and the moral/spiritual shape of human
experience, it is necessary to talk about modern
nationalism, communism, and a number of other
organized movements that may have arisen from
within the immanent frame of reference but which
8
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function as displacement religions. Their aim is to
displace Christianity, for example, from its place
as the publicly recognized and supported religion
of a state or empire. But these movements are not
thereby un-religious or non-religious. Rather, they
function as displacement faiths, as what August
Comte called the religion of humanity, or what
John Dewey called the religion of democracy, or
what we know of in America as the American civil
religion. And the gods these secularized religions
create are, from a Christian point of view, false
gods—idols.
A few days before the Fourth of July, 2011,
The Washington Post published an op-ed piece by
Leon Kass5 in which he expressed worries about
America’s increasing “thoughtlessness” about the
meaning of Independence Day. He offered as an
antidote some quotations from President Calvin
Coolidge’s address on the 150th anniversary of the
Declaration of Independence in 1926. That declaration, said Coolidge, “‘represented the movement of a people…a great mass of independent,
liberty-loving, God-fearing people who knew their
rights, and possessed the courage to dare to maintain them.’” What was the source of the ideas held
sacred by Americans? It was, says Coolidge, their
faith in “’the fatherhood of God and the brotherhood of man. They justified freedom by the
text that we are all created in the divine image,
all partakers of the divine spirit.’” And, “‘Unless
the faith of the American people in these religious
convictions is to endure, the principles of our
Declaration will perish.’” Did Coolidge’s faith in
America’s god border on intolerance? Not at all,
says Kass, because America’s civil religion includes
support for religious freedom. Coolidge “was no
religious fanatic. He appreciated our constitutional strictures against religious establishment
and religious tests for office, limitations crucial
to religious freedom and toleration, also principles unique to the American founding. But he
understood that free institutions and economic
prosperity rest on cultural grounds, which in turn
rest on religious foundations.” America, that is, is
a religiously grounded nation, which supports denominational religious freedom, as Coolidge and
Kass have summed it up. Two uses of the word
“religion” must be distinguished: the nonsectarian

national religion, on the one hand, which supports
freedom for the practice of private denominational
religions, on the other.
At one point, Taylor says that until the 1960s
the American way of life was supported by three
sides of a triangle: “the family was the matrix in
which the young were brought up to be good citizens and believing worshippers; religion was the
source of the values that animated both family
and society; and the state was the realization and
bulwark of the values central to both family and
churches. And this was all the more starkly underlined by the fact that American freedom needed
to defend itself against ‘Godless Communism’”
(506). First, notice Taylor’s identification of religion with one side of the triangle, the side that
generates values for family and society. The state,
too, is only one side of the triangle. But what is the
identity of the triangular unit as a whole? Is it not
the American nation? Taylor does not identify the
triangular unit as religious, however, even though
he points out that America’s role in the Cold War
was to defend itself and the world against godless
communism. As the words suggest, that defense
amounted to much more than a military campaign
against Soviet military aggression. It was understood as a religiously deep national crusade against
a religiously antagonistic enemy. It was a mission
by the god-chosen nation to save the world from
destruction by an anti-godly communist nation
seeking world domination.
Civilizational States
Peter J. Katzenstein sheds light on this drama in
his discussion of the complex and multifaceted
nature of “civilizational states” such as the United
6
States, Japan, Russia, and China in particular.
The civilizations from which such states arise and
which they carry forward in ongoing development
have deep religious roots that are often ignored by
modern scholars. The fact is that “different religious traditions act as cultural sources for the enactment of different programs of modernity.” And
today through its war on terrorism, Katzenstein
continues, “America’s religiously rooted sense
of nationalism has become a defining element.
Varieties of secularisms and religions remain a vital
force in world politics and the foreign policies of

the civilizational state we call America.”
Modern civil religions, America’s included,
function as part of historically extended civilizational dramas that often include violent as well as
nonviolent conflict. Taylor’s account of the emergence of the secular age is largely limited to descriptions of what now exists that has reset the “conditions of belief ” as he interprets them. Traditional
religious institutions and cultic practices largely
accommodated themselves to those changes over
time. But Taylor’s descriptive categorizing does not
quite capture the contentious drama of civilizational forces in the way that Katzenstein describes
them. Just as there were violent struggles among
Roman Catholic, Protestant, and secular modernist movements from the sixteenth through the
eighteenth centuries in Europe, and just as there
have been all-or-nothing battles between Western
nations and empires driven by competing ideologies and ambitions in the nineteenth through the
twentieth centuries, so there continue to be religiously deep struggles among nationalist, fascist,
communist, and other secular-humanist movements seeking to establish dominance in societies
where people of traditional faiths may be seeking
to gain or recover positions of social and political

Christians, it seems to me,
should be able to recognize
that America’s god is not the
biblical God, and that the
American civil-religious way
of life is not fully compatible
with a biblically directed way
of life.
influence or control. Such conflicts are especially
evident today on many fronts in many parts of the
world and not only in the West.
The American effort to organize a coherent social and political order, says Taylor, was made possible because the diverse private faiths of citizens
had a “consensual relation to the common civil
religion. Go to the church of your choice, but go.
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Later this expands to include synagogues. When
imams also begin to appear at prayer breakfasts,
along with priests, pastors, and rabbis, the signal
is that Islam is being invited into the consensus. That means that one can be integrated as an
American through one’s faith or religious identity”
(534). These comments capture only one side of
the process at work in the United States through
much of its history. Insofar as Christians and eventually Jews and Muslims have found encouragement from their respective faith communities to
take part in the American way of life, their different faiths have indeed given positive encouragement for civic integration. But what is the attracting force from the public side? What is it that
citizens of diverse faiths become integrated into?
What draws or drives them into it? Taylor refers to
that public draw as simply America—becoming an
American. But this draw—becoming American—
does not bring to light the civil-religious bond of
the nation that supports the so-called “sectarian”
religious bonds of the denominational faiths.
One way to show how the American civil religion has made its demands of diverse religious
groups (now typically referred to as sectarian) is
to look at the school wars of the nineteenth century. From its founding until about World War
II, the American experiment depended more on a
Protestant-deist moral consensus at the heart of its
civil religion than on the durability of its political
institutions, which, of course, did not manage to
stave off the Civil War. The gradual disestablishment of churches in the new States of the union
depended on the religio-cultural consensus created
by White Anglo-Saxon Protestantism (WASP).
That is why it took some time before Jews and others were accepted as full Americans and allowed
to hold office. For African Americans it took even
longer to be included. Catholics represented a particular threat from the 1830s on into the twentieth
century because large-scale Catholic immigration
challenged the WASP public-moral consensus.
The biggest battles arose over schooling.
When Catholics (and some Baptists) in New
York City in the 1840s asked for the type of public subsidy for their schools that was extended to
WASP schools, the New York Free School Society,
with encouragement from the New York City
10
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Common Council, changed its name to the New
York Public School Society. That organization
then decided that public funds should henceforth
be distributed only to “nonsectarian” schools and
not to what the society labeled “sectarian” schools.
This decision had nothing to do with trying to
establish a Protestant church or to enforce a uniform confession of ecclesiastical faith on the entire
population. What the New York Public School
Society did was to monopolize public funding for
the “common schools” that represented and taught
the WASP way of life as the American way of life.
These were the schools that eventually came to be
called public schools. All children were welcome to
attend them without charge (for they were tax supported), but in them children would read the King
James Bible, hear Protestant (or deist) prayers,
and receive an education that would guide them
onto the right path of the American way of life. If
parents wanted their children to attend Catholic
schools, they were free to organize them at their
own expense, for such schools were considered
sectarian and not representative of America’s nonsectarian public ethos.
If one thinks of religion in a narrow sense as a
matter of ecclesiastical institutions, liturgies, and
personal beliefs, then Catholics did not experience religious discrimination in New York and
Massachusetts and beyond. However, if one recognizes the broader meaning of religions as ways of
life, some of which can integrate the public life of
a community and even of a nation or civilization,
then the American way of life in the nineteenth
century was certainly religious in a WASPish way.
The cultivating of national values was not entrusted to families and churches alone. Catholic
schools would not be granted public funding and
equal public-legal recognition because they used
the wrong version of the Bible and acknowledged
as their highest earthly authority an ecclesiastical official (the pope) who was not subject to the
American constitution and the mores of America’s
civic faith. Making no public-legal room for selffunded sectarian schools sealed the distinction between the public character of the American way
of life and the private character of denominational
religions. This nonsectarian/sectarian framework
remains in place today, largely defining the terms

of countless debates and court cases involving
schooling, welfare services, health-care delivery,
and more.
Taylor’s book may be lauded in different ways,
but in my estimation his description and mapping
of what makes this a secular age works with too
narrow a view of religion and the conditions of
belief that characterize the age. A Secular Age does
not take us far enough into a critical account of
the public, religiously deep civilizational dynamics
that have been uniting and dividing, integrating
and disintegrating societies, including modern societies, for a very long time.
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